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Three years after the global financial crisis (GFC) it is timely to assess its 
origins, impacts and consequences.  The dominant explanation for the 
crisis in popular discourse has focused on factors that lie outside the 
sphere of capital accumulation, whether these are the ‘common sense’ 
ideas that the GFC resulted from unbridled ‘greed’ by the bankers or the 
incapacity of poor people to manage their mortgages, or the Keynesian 
notion that the crisis resulted from inadequate regulation of the financial 
system (Elliott & Atkinson, 2008; Roubini, 2009). To the extent that 
there is a solution to these problems, other than moral homilies addressed 
to financiers, most writers have pointed to the need for better regulation 
of the financial system and a more balanced relationship between 
financial and productive capital (Arestis & Sawyer, 2010). Such themes 
are evident also in the work of some of those working in the Marxist 
tradition, such as Blackburn (2008). Common to all of them is the idea 
that capitalism can somehow be reformed into performing more 
effectively and future crises warded off (McNally, 2011: 88). 
In this article I draw on a very different account of the crisis provided by 
Chris Harman (2009) which builds upon and updates his earlier work 
(Harman, 1984). In these books Harman provides a cogent account of the 
development of post-war capitalism and capitalism’s crisis tendencies 
and uses these to explain the roots of the GFC. Harman (2009) argues 
that the crisis has its roots not in financialisation or greedy bankers, but 
the long term slowing down in the dynamism of the advanced 
economies. While this gradual slowing of the advanced economies is 
something that has been recognised and widely discussed by a range of 
writers (Itoh, 1990; Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1991; Brenner, 2006), 
Harman provides a compelling account of Marx's analysis of capital 
accumulation and spells out a persuasive explanation of the boom and 
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systematic account of the background to the crisis. It is for this reason 
that I use his work for what follows. The contribution of this article lies 
in the analysis that is provided for the period since the onset of the GFC, 
which is where Harman’s last book finishes. While the GFC marked a 
crisis in the world economy at large, the focus of the article is on the 
advanced economies and in particular the United States whose GDP - at 
$14.7 trillion – is equivalent in size to the next three largest economies, 
China, Japan and Germany, combined (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), 2011a).  
The Origins of the Crash: a Long Term Perspective 
The quarter century following the end of World War II was characterised 
by strong capital accumulation, full employment, rising real wages and 
sustained growth in every Western economy (Maddison, 2003; Harman, 
2009: 161; McNally, 2011: 27). This was a period of growing and 
relatively evenly distributed prosperity. But from the early 1970s crisis 
tendencies became increasingly obvious and in 1974 the post-war boom 
came to an end. Since that time, most advanced economies have 
experienced at least two serious recessions, and many, three, each 
characterised by high unemployment (McNally, 2009). The intensity of 
these recessions and the periods of growth experienced between each of 
them have evidently varied across different countries but the general 
trend is fairly consistent.  
Harman, among others, sources this great slowdown in the Western 
economies to the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.1 That the rate of 
profit fell in the latter stages of the post-war boom is not controversial 
and is widely accepted by writers including Dumenil & Levy (2002), 
Brenner (2006), Mohun (2006) and McNally (2011). But the reason for 
the fall in the rate of profit is contested (Shaikh, 1978; 1999). Harman 
(2009: 68-72) uses Marx’s analysis in Capital volumes I and III as the 
foundation for his explanation. A brief elucidation follows. Driven by 
competition, Marx argued that each capitalist is forced to invest greater 
sums of capital in constant capital as opposed to variable capital – 
                                                           
1  In a series of appendices to his 1984 book, Harman deals with a range of other 
explanations for the crisis of the 1970s. See also Shaikh (1978) and Kliman 
(2007). 
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machinery as opposed to labour power – in order to cheapen costs of 
production. The result is a rising organic composition of capital. While 
every capitalist who engages in this process enjoys a higher rate of profit 
by doing so, the overall effect, ceteris paribus, is to reduce the general 
rate of profit in a given country or sector because only labour power is 
capable of creating additional value over and above its own cost of 
reproduction.  
Marx traces, and Harman elaborates upon, a series of ‘counteracting 
causes’ which offset this tendency for the rate of profit to fall (Harman, 
1984: 20-49; Harman, 2009: 72-75). In particular, Harman points to the 
destruction of capital during the Great Depression and World War II as 
the foundations for the post-war boom, and this growth was further 
sustained by what Harman calls, after Kidron (1968), a ‘permanent arms 
economy’, the process by which capital was siphoned off into waste 
production, in this case the arms industry, and thereby removed from the 
process of capital accumulation (Harman, 2009: 129-32; 166-68). The 
organic composition of capital was thereby held down for a prolonged 
period, putting a floor under the rate of profit.  
But the permanent arms economy could not work forever to stave off a 
return to crisis. The post-war boom came to an end when the United 
States was forced to respond to rising Japanese and German competition 
by diverting surplus back into productive accumulation and away from 
arms production, thereby driving up the organic composition of capital 
and pushing down the rate of profit (Harman, 2009: 198-200). The 
weakening of US capitalism was indicated by the end of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971, but it was the oil and commodity price shock and 
the inflationary surge that resulted that finally ended the long boom. 
The stagflationary crisis of the mid to late 1970s was the catalyst for a 
major rethink in the ranks of the capitalist classes and their states 
(Harman, 2009: 192). Keynesianism was junked, monetarism was toyed 
with, wages controls were implemented but none of these moves restored 
the system to its earlier dynamism (McNally, 2011: 31-33). It was in this 
context that the Thatcher government and Reagan administrations 
launched their programs – marking the beginning of what is now known 
as neoliberalism (McNally, 2011: 33-36; 42-49). The neoliberal 
revolution under Thatcher and Reagan had two essential components: 
destruction of inefficient capital through high interest rates (the ‘Volcker 
squeeze’), privatisation, deregulation and, in the case of the UK at least, 
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harsh government austerity; and, second, a sustained attack on the 
working class in order to increase the rate of exploitation by raising both 
absolute and relative surplus value (Moody, 2007). Other factors that 
contributed to the partial recovery in the rate of profit included more 
efficient use of the capital stock, including methods such as just in time 
and lean production, increased unproductive expenditure on marketing 
and advertising, and a slowing down in the rate of accumulation which 
reduced pressure on the organic composition of capital to rise over time. 
While the US and UK led the way, most other Western economies 
followed suit over the subsequent decade, marking a new ‘Washington 
Consensus’. The results were fairly uniform: a higher average level of 
unemployment, a further concentration and centralisation of capital, 
stagnation (or reductions) in real wages, and a substantial shift in the 
distribution of income to capital versus labour. The mass of profits 
soared and the rate of profit began to recover (Mohun, 2006; McNally, 
2009; Shaikh, 2010). 
The rising rate of profit in the US in the 1980s and 1990s did not resolve 
certain underlying problems for the American capitalist class. First, 
growth rates were, on average, lower than they had been during the post-
war boom, and this applied to both the rates of GDP growth and 
investment growth (Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Harman, 2009, 231-32; 
Beitel, 2010). Indeed, on Brenner’s figures, capital accumulation slowed 
successively across the G7 in every decade after the 1960s (Brenner, 
2006: 282). According to Harman (2009: 233) and Kliman (2009), the 
growth of the system was held back by the fact that the crisis mechanism, 
in particular the devaluation of capital, did not work its way through. The 
crisis of the 1920s required the slump of the Great Depression and a 
world war to achieve the purging of capital that was required to restore 
vigour to the Western economies (Harman, 1984: 71-74). However, such 
has been the concentration and centralisation of capital since that time, 
involving a growing size of firms and rising interconnectedness, both 
domestically and internationally, that the US government and those of 
other advanced states could not afford simply to let ‘their’ businesses go 
to the wall, for fear of the chain reaction across the whole national 
economy (Harman, 2009: 233). Some household names such as Texaco, 
PanAm and Enron certainly went under, and the number of bankruptcies 
grew over time; but the process did not extend sufficiently to provide a 
stimulus for a fresh round of expansion (Kliman, 2009). And so, while 
the rate of profit in the US in the 2000s was certainly higher than 20 
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years previously, it was still lower than in the 1960s and the early 1980s 
(Brenner, 2006: 7).2 In Japan and Germany the situation was more urgent 
as the rate of profit continued to trend downwards through the whole 
period (Brenner, 2006: 7). 
The second major problem experienced by the capitalists was that one of 
the most important methods that they had used to boost the rate of profit 
– squeezing the wages share, and in the United States, real wages 
(Brenner, 2006: 4 & 283) - also held back growth of markets. Wage cuts 
may have enabled the American capitalist class to reap more surplus 
value from the working class but they also limited its ability to realise 
this value.3 Every capitalist was busy cutting wages while wanting their 
rival to raise theirs. And, with investment in retreat due to an inadequate 
rate of profit, demand for the output of American industry suffered. 
Although US capacity utilisation in industry experienced cyclical 
volatility, the general trend was downwards (Figure 1).  
It is in this context that we can understand the significance of the 
‘financialisation’ that accompanied the neoliberal revolution. With rates 
of profit still relatively weak in productive industry (compared to the 
post-war boom), but with ever growing pools of investible funds, 
capitalists in many advanced countries, both productive and financial, 
looked to the financial sector, where profit rates were higher, as an outlet 
for their investments (Harman, 2009: 283). The result was a speculative 
boom in Western real estate and the stock markets, starting in 1982 and 
interrupted only briefly by the 1987 crash and the 2000 dotcom bust 
(Harman, 2009: 278-79). The proportion of profits accounted for by 
financial investment as opposed to productive investment grew steadily 
(Blackburn, 2006: 39). Cheap money flooded the Western economies, 
encouraging companies to borrow to invest more in further speculation. 
Such asset price bubbles helped to create an illusion of profitability. In 
practice, all that they were doing was putting off the day of reckoning. 
Measures used by the Federal Reserve – chiefly the reduction of interest 
rates – to reboot the domestic economy after each speculative bubble 
burst only exacerbated the problem, even if they provided some short 
term relief (McNally, 2011: 102).  
                                                           
2  Although it should be noted that Kliman (2009) challenges the notion that the rate 
of profit in US industry experienced any sustained recovery prior to 2000. 
3  Such “realisation crises” are discussed by Marx in volume III of Capital (Chapter 
15, section 1). 
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Figure 1: Capacity utilisation in US industry, 1967-2011 
 
 
Thus the reduction in interest rates following the dot com bust only 
prepared the way for the property bubble of the 2000s which had an 
impact on not just the United States, but Australia, Ireland, Spain, the 
UK and a host of other countries (Harman, 2009: 286). Plentiful supplies 
of cheap money also allowed US households to borrow more in order to 
offset the declining value of their wages and thereby sustained markets 
for the output of American producers (Harman, 2009: 287; Kliman, 
2009)). Household and corporate indebtedness grew rapidly. And, under 
the George W Bush administration, US government debt also rose 
sharply as cuts to taxes on capital and high income earners, alongside a 
steep increase in military spending, took their toll. 
It is important to note that ‘financialisation’ flowed from factors that had 
their roots in the weakness of productive capitalism. But it did not mark 
any victory of finance over industry, as Dumenil and Levy (2004) and 
Crotty (2005) suggest. The big industrial corporations such as General 
Motors also joined in, finding that they could make as much money from 
financial operations as they could from actually making commodities 
(Harman, 2009: 284-85). Further, the financial boom then fed back into 
the productive sector, with strong demand for housing fuelling demand 
for construction and consumer goods and thence to raw materials and 
heavy industry (Harman, 2009: 288). 
The economic growth of the 2000s, underwritten by this process of 
financial expansion, underlay the optimism that pervaded reports by the 
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international financial organisations such as the IMF in the mid-2000s. 
Successive Federal Reserve chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke 
were applauded as astute economic managers. US growth, although weak 
compared to the boom of the 1950s and 1960s, provided markets for the 
world trading system as it turned into importer of last resort. In Europe 
the boom eased the transition problems associated with the integration of 
the EU27. US growth also assisted China, which broke through in the 
2000s as a major exporter and cheap labour source for Western 
manufacturers moving offshore. Finally, an apparent synergy developed 
in the 2000s between the so-called ‘surplus’ nations of Germany and 
China and the rest of the European Union and the United States. 
Germany restricted wages and cut social spending through its Agenda 
2010 program, and used the cheap euro to depress imports and boost 
exports (to 40 per cent of GDP), thereby establishing a trade surplus 
equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP. China too capitalised on low wages and 
a low exchange rate to boost its exports to the US, running up significant 
trade surpluses equivalent to 5 per cent of GDP. The reserves of US 
dollars or Euros held by China and Germany resulting from increasing 
trade surpluses were then ploughed back into purchases of government 
bonds in debtor nations, in particular the US and Southern Europe 
(Padoan, 2011). Given that China and other East Asian surplus nations 
appeared to have no limit to their appetite for US bonds, the US 
government under George W. Bush saw no problem with extending its 
budget deficit with successive tax cuts for the rich. The purchase of US 
bonds by the governments of East Asia and the oil producing nations also 
prevented their currencies from rising (thereby maintaining their 
competitiveness) and their domestic money supply from accelerating. 
And surplus government purchases of debtor government bonds helped 
to keep the latters’ economies expanding, thereby providing markets for 
the former. 
This review of conditions as they existed at the time of the GFC in the 
last quarter of 2008 is necessary to deal with the argument that the GFC 
was the result of bad policy, lack of regulation or factors external to the 
circuits of capital accumulation. If this were the case the current crisis 
could be overcome by intelligent policy fixes. On the contrary, I suggest 
that the current crisis has its roots in the crisis of profitability in the 
1970s and the measures that were adopted to respond to that. To 
summarise: the neoliberal response to the crisis of the mid-1970s 
involved restructuring of capital and suppression of working class living 
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standards. These measures boosted the rate of profit rate but not 
sufficiently to fuel a sustained and broad based advance in the world 
economy. The result was that an increasing proportion of surplus value 
generated in the productive sector was devoted to the financial sector, 
yielding paper profits or fictitious capital, rather than extended 
accumulation. Further, the restorative measures that were used in the 
1980s and 1990s to overcome the crisis paved the way for the current 
crisis and the weak recovery in three ways. First, attempts to boost the 
rate of profit by cutting wages depressed consumer spending on which 
sustained recovery might be based, and efforts to overcome this by 
extending credit to households spurred the speculative bubbles which 
eventually burst with the GFC. Second, the process of regular capital 
destruction, which Marx argued was a crucial regenerative feature of 
capitalism, did not work its way through comprehensively. And, third, 
the apparently mutually beneficial relationship between the surplus and 
deficit nations established in the 2000s could and did turn sour when the 
crisis of 2008 unfolded. 
The Crisis in the US and Other Advanced Economies 
Today 
The existence of deep underlying problems in the advanced economies 
even during the growth phase of the 2000s helps explain why a housing 
crisis in the United States quickly brought the world economy to its 
deepest crisis since the Great Depression. The bust in the US housing 
sector, starting in 2007, resulted from excess housing stock and a surge 
in mortgage defaults associated with rising unemployment and an 
inability to pay. A series of mid-tier US banks began to topple. The 
process by which fictitious or paper profits had been created over the 
preceding 10 years – through pricing financial assets at their highly 
inflated bubble values (‘mark to market’) – now went into reverse and 
deleveraging began. With US housing prices falling sharply (Standard 
and Poor’s, 2011), the entire US financial system, which had become 
increasingly dependent for its expansion on real estate speculation and 
the creation of highly leveraged synthetic and repackaged financial 
assets, was seized by panic. The credit crunch of September-October 
2008 resulted and the entire structure of Western capitalism, and thence 
world capitalism, appeared at risk (McNally, 2011: 13-20). Industrial 
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output and world trade plunged (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2010). 
Fixed investment in the advanced economies, already falling before the 
crash, plummeted in 2008-09 (Figure 2). Unemployment rose sharply 
(Figure 3). Capacity utilisation in the US fell rapidly from 81 per cent in 
January 2008 to 67 per cent by June 2009 (Figure 1) and company profits 
dropped from $1.35 trillion in 2006 to $850 billion in 2008 (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2011a). 
Western governments and central banks took three measures to prevent 
the GFC turning into a catastrophic shutdown (Khatiwada, 2009). First, 
they bailed out the threatened banks, which converted the debts 
accumulated by the main investment banks into public debt. With 
governments standing behind the banks, some confidence was restored 
and bank to bank lending resumed, ending the credit crunch. Second, 
governments issued stimulus packages of additional spending to reflate 
the economies and boost world trade. And, third, central banks cut their 
cash rate to zero, or close to it, in an attempt to spark business investment 
and consumer spending (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011). 
 
Figure 2: Investment as % of GDP, 2000-10 
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Figure 3: Unemployment rates, 2008-10 
 
 
Source:  OECD (2010a) 
 
These emergency measures contributed to a snap-back. World trade and 
output stopped shrinking and began to grow again in the latter half of 
2009 (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2010; Padoan, 2011). GDP across the 
G7 started to recover (Figure 4, next page).  
The restocking of inventories by manufacturers in 2009, reversing the 
cost-cutting depletion of inventories at the height of the crisis in late 
2008, also boosted production. Labour productivity and capacity 
utilisation in the US rose strongly (OECD, 2010b: 5; also Figure 1). 
Company profits recovered most of the ground lost in 2007-09 (Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, 2011a) and higher profits and low interest rates 
drove the stock market higher - the Dow Jones industrial average rose 
from its March 2009 trough of 6,627 to 11,204 by April 2010. 
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Figure 4: Quarterly change in G7 GDP, 2007-10 
 
Nonetheless, the recovery lost momentum fairly quickly and quarterly 
rates of growth across the G7 began to slide (Figure 4). In Q1 2011, GDP 
in Britain and the US rose by only 0.5 per cent and 0.4 per cent 
respectively (OECD, 2011). These GDP data suggest that the advanced 
economies are far from a sustained recovery. It appears that, like the oil 
and commodity price shock of 1973-74, the housing crisis in the US was 
only the tip of the iceberg. Several factors that prevent a sustained and 
strong recovery can be traced back to the problems that existed in the 
years leading up to the bust of 2008.  
Depressed Consumer Spending and Business Investment 
The first problem is the consistent weakness in household spending. For 
a long period working class living standards were squeezed as part of the 
neoliberal revolution; consumption was only sustained by the expansion 
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of personal credit. The GFC exacerbated this situation as it squeezed the 
working class still further.4 The number of people employed in the US 
fell by six per cent over the course of 2008 and 2009 and the recovery of 
GDP in 2010-11 saw only a modest recovery in jobs (Rampell, 2011). 
The total number of US workers either registered as unemployed, 
underemployed or jobless and no longer looking for work stood at 23 
million in March 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Amongst those 
American workers who remained in work, many lost overtime and in 
some cases experienced pay cuts. For those joining the workforce, many 
American employers have now set lower rates of pay (‘two-tier pay 
scales’) for new recruits. The result was that median income for US 
households fell in real terms by $2,188 between 2007 and 2009 (US 
Census, 2010). Wealth has become even more skewed towards the rich 
(Economic Policy Institute, 2011) and the poverty rate has soared. One in 
seven Americans (44 million) are now living below the meagre US 
poverty line of $22,000 for a family of four, and one in six (51 million) 
are without health insurance (US Census, 2010). 
The US housing market was still suffering excess supply and low prices 
and, after a brief and shallow recovery in 2010, house prices were 
dropping again in early 2011 (Standard and Poor’s, 2011). With the 
housing sector still in a slump, many millions of American workers 
remain trapped by negative equity in their homes. Others have been 
thrown out of their homes and are living with family members, in 
shelters or in their cars. The banks, which were liberal with housing 
loans in the credit bubble of the 1990s and 2000s, are reluctant to extend 
credit to working class households now that housing prices have fallen so 
low.  The ‘wealth effect’, whereby workers borrowed on the strength of 
the increased equity in their homes as prices rose, has now gone into 
reverse.  
The result of falling median incomes and household wealth is that 
household spending in the US, which accounts for 70 per cent of GDP, 
has failed to recover strongly during the economic recovery of 2009-11. 
In 2010 US consumer spending rose in real terms by a modest 1.7 per 
cent (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011b), far below the usual bounce-
back after a deep recession. The weakness in consumer spending also 
                                                           
4  For more detail on the plight of the US working class, see Gould and Shierholz 
(2010). 
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holds back business investment which could, in other circumstances, give 
a fillip to growth. In the US, non residential fixed investment grew by 
only 5.7 per cent in 2010, after dropping sharply by 17.1 per cent in 2009 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011b). Business is holding its bumper 
profits in cash reserves or is extending them in speculative ventures 
rather than productive investment. 
A similar pattern of weak consumer spending and business investment 
holds true in other advanced economies. Unemployment in the EU stands 
at 23 million, 50 per cent higher than in 2007, and the unemployment 
rate is 9.5 per cent (Eurostat, 2011). Consumer spending in the G7 rose 
by only 1.9 per cent in 2010 (OECD, 2011) while G7 gross fixed capital 
formation rose by a sturdier 5.0 per cent for the year, but by only 0.4 per 
cent in Q4 2010 (OECD, 2011). None of these figures suggests a robust 
recovery. 
Governments are now adding to the downward pressure on living 
standards and thus consumption with their austerity budgets. In late 2008 
and in the first half of 2009, governments across the OECD borrowed 
trillions of dollars to bail out banks and stimulate their economies. On the 
other side of the ledger, government income was hit hard as businesses 
shut down and workers lost their jobs. The rise in social security outlays 
accompanying mass unemployment and tax cuts for business and the 
wealthy also contributed to the mix. The result was a sharp rise in budget 
deficits and public debt (Padoan, 2011). Since early 2010, with the worst 
of the downturn over, economic debate is now focused on the sovereign 
debt crisis, and governments across the advanced economies are now 
cutting spending in order to reduce public debt. 
Pressure to wind back the debt comes from several quarters. Some 
capitalists have a direct interest in the matter – banks that have bought 
government bonds which they fear may not be repaid if the most 
indebted governments (most obviously the so-called ‘PIIGS’ in Europe – 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) default on their debts 
(Lapavitsas, 2010). Of these nations, Italy is rather different because, 
although highly indebted, it has not been pressured by the speculators in 
the same way as the others, and ‘the markets’ appear to be relatively 
calm about its prospects at the moment. Northern European banks want 
the other PIIGS governments to cut borrowing to ensure that they can 
repay their existing loans. A default by any of the PIIGS will slash the 
asset sheets of the lending banks and jeopardise the weak recovery under 
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way. Then there are those capitalists that have interests and investments 
in those banks that have loaned money or hold bonds in the PIIGS. These 
include banks and investors in the USA. The fortunes of the Greek and 
Spanish governments are tied to the stockholders of New York by a 
chain of shaky loans and investments.  
Over the course of 2010 and early 2011, speculators, acting on the belief 
that these governments would default on their debts, drove up interest 
rates on the bonds of Greece, Ireland and Portugal – in the case of the 
first to as much as 12 per cent at a time when the average rate for euro 
member states was only 4 per cent (Padoan, 2011). These governments 
were thereby forced to rely on bailouts from the European Union and 
IMF, totalling hundreds of billions of euros to finance their operations. In 
essence, this was a transfer of funds from the richer EU member states to 
the banks domiciled within their own borders. Attention has now turned 
to Spain. 
Other governments have debt to GDP ratios that are similar to those of 
the PIIGS: 80-100 per cent in the case of the USA, Britain, France and 
Germany, as compared to 130 per cent in Italy and Greece and 100 per 
cent in Ireland and Portugal (Padoan, 2011). None, however, faces any 
immediate threat to its ability to raise money in capital markets. Such is 
the size of their economies and, in the case of the US, its ability to fund 
its debt by issuing dollars, that the markets have judged that these 
governments are financially secure and at no threat of defaulting.  
Nonetheless, the debt crisis has become as pressing a political question in 
these countries as in the much more precariously positioned PIIGS. The 
debt crisis here is as much an excuse by the capitalist classes to make 
heavy inroads into the welfare states of Europe and what remains of the 
social security and Medicaid systems of the United States. Despite 
neoliberal rhetoric about small government, social welfare spending as a 
proportion of GDP actually grew in the 1980s and 1990s across the 
OECD (Figure 5). This trend continued into the 2000s, with the British 
government spending more on social security, health and education as a 
proportion of GDP in 2009-10 than ever before (Figure 6). Now the 
capitalists see an opportunity to make serious cuts to state outlays on the 
working class so as to enhance their competitiveness and raise the rate of 
exploitation. 
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Figure 5: Welfare expenditure as % of GDP, 1979 and 1995 
  
 
Whether the debt crisis is in any sense real or only manufactured, the 
outcome is the same: the imposition of drastic austerity measures across 
the West. In virtually every country, governments have cut public sector 
pay, axed public sector jobs, frozen pensions, reduced aged care 
programs, lowered unemployment benefits, reduced funding for 
prescription drugs, raised indirect taxes (VAT), and sold off public 
enterprises (McNally, 2011: 21-24). The cuts have been most severe in 
the PIIGS but workers in the richest European countries have also 
experienced austerity. The Conservative- Lib Dem government in Britain 
announced cuts of £81 billion in its October 2010 budget, the deepest 
cuts to public spending proportionately since 1922. Half a million public 
sector jobs will be lost as a result. The Merkel government in Germany 
has committed itself to cutting the budget deficit in Germany by $US13 
billion each year for the next five years. The Sarkozy Government’s cuts 
to state pensions in October 2010 are just the first of what are expected to 
be a series of attacks on the French welfare state in coming years. Across 
the Atlantic, the Obama administration announced $38 billion in 
spending cuts to the US federal budget in April 2011 and put forward 
plans to reduce government net outlays by $4 trillion over the next ten 
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years. The Republican opposition is promoting still harsher austerity, 
with $6 trillion in proposed cuts. State and local governments for their 
part, lacking federal government funding and unable to run budget 
deficits for more than a year or two, are closing schools and fire stations, 
cutting public sector pay and sacking tens of thousands of public 
servants.  
 
Figure 6: Social spending in the UK as % GDP, 1953-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  The Guardian (2010) 
Austerity budgets are reducing spending power in every country where 
they are implemented. GDP in Greece fell by 6.8 per cent in 2010 and in 
Ireland, where the process is only just under way, by 0.5 per cent 
(OECD, 2011). Unemployment in these two countries rose in 2010 from 
10.2 per cent to 14.1 per cent and from 13.1 per cent to 14.7 per cent 
respectively (Eurostat, 2011). In Portugal, soon to undergo its fourth 
austerity budget since the onset of the GFC, growth in 2010 was only 1.0 
per cent and unemployment stands at 11.1 per cent (OECD, 2011; 
Eurostat, 2011). The stronger countries too are affected. In April 2011, 
the IMF cut its forecast for British growth for 2011 to only 1.75 per cent, 
as the country struggles to absorb the impact of substantial public sector 
spending cuts (IMF, 2011b). Furthermore, austerity will only feed upon 
38     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 67 
itself. With shrinking economies in the PIIGS, the tax base - and with it 
the capacity to repay the public debt - falls further, and the ratio of debt 
to GDP will grow (Varoufakis, 2010). The PIIGS may be trapped in a 
deflationary spiral – interest rates in Greece and Ireland in April 2011 
were higher than before the 2010 EU/IMF bailouts, raising the question 
of what will occur when the bailouts end in 2013. It is likely that the EU 
will either have to accept a restructuring of PIIGS debt or provide further 
loans before the current ones expire.  
The governments of the stronger European nations are facing the same 
dilemma as the US government experienced in the 1980s and 1990s: to 
what extent are they prepared to keep bailing out bankrupt entities 
(whether corporations or other governments) for fear of the alternative – 
default, bringing with it serious repercussions not just to the entities 
concerned but to the stability of the wider system. The German 
government is well aware that any sudden move on its part to insist on 
harsher conditions threatens bankruptcy on the part of its PIIGS debtors 
and the possibility that German banks will lose billions of euros through 
loan defaults. For the time being, the German government is committed 
to propping up the PIIGS governments. Likewise, while the Bush 
administration allowed the investment bank Lehman  Brothers to go 
broke in 2008, scared by the financial panic that followed, both Bush and 
Obama have stepped in to prevent any further such bankruptcies. The 
Irish government simply nationalised two of the country’s three major 
banks, rather than let them fail, and in doing so amassed a budget deficit 
in 2009 equivalent to 32 per cent of GDP. The stimulus packages and the 
bailouts prevented an economic collapse but have locked in problems for 
the future.  
Toxic Debts Weighing on the Banks 
The expansion of private sector debt, the growth of financial investments 
as a proportion of total investment and the low interest rate regime 
pursued by the Federal Reserve under Greenspan and Bernanke helped, 
as I argued above, to prevent a relapse of the US economy in the 1990s 
and 2000s back into the crisis conditions of the mid-1970s and early 
1980s. Nonetheless, much of the rise in asset values in this period was 
based on speculative or fictitious gains. As Marx argued in Capital 
volume III, financial assets represent a claim on surplus value created 
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elsewhere in the productive sector of the economy (Marx, 1972: 465-68). 
If the generation of surplus value in the productive sector lags behind the 
rise in the market value of financial assets, at some point a correction 
will eventually occur. This is precisely what happened with the onset of 
the GFC.  
The banks and institutional investors now had to face the fact that the 
mark to market value of their financial assets, set in the bubble-driven 
2000s, bore no relation to the new, GFC-influenced price at which these 
assets could now be sold (Harman, 2009: 290; McNally, 2011: 19-20). 
The Federal Reserve stepped in to help US banks by purchasing $1.5 
trillion in toxic debts in 2008. But the rest of the debt, the true value of 
which is not known, partly thanks to the weakened bank reporting 
requirements introduced by the Bush administration in the early stages of 
the GFC, still sits on their balance sheets. These securities are highly 
leveraged on a US housing sector that is still in a poor condition. The 
banks holding these assets cannot sell them on the open market because 
they would crystallise an enormous loss by so doing. So they hang onto 
them – as bad debt.  
The US banking sector, which pumped up the bubble economy of the 
1990s and 2000s, is now a drag on the productive economy in the US, 
even if the banks are making big profits. Weighed down by bad debt, 
undermined by weak domestic demand for credit from both households 
and businesses, and with plenty of opportunities to make profits simply 
by gaming the various bailout mechanisms still in place, banks have seen 
no reason to risk their capital on lending to initiate a new round of 
expansion in the productive sector (McNally, 2011: 8). Further, the risky 
practices engaged in by many banks during the speculative boom are still 
in play, and the new Basel III regulations  (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010), even when they are imposed in 2013, will do nothing 
to rein these in. 
BRICS White Knights? 
In the years running up to the GFC much hope was placed in the rise of 
China, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China) more broadly, as 
potential ‘white knights’ for the West. It was hoped that, even if the 
Western economies were suffering from a variety of problems, the 
BRICS could keep the world economy growing. This illusion was 
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punctured in the GFC when output, trade and investment fell across the 
world economy, the BRICS included. Russia and Brazil experienced a 
collapse of industrial production and India saw modest growth wiped out. 
Chinese growth slowed sharply in late 2008 and the first half of 2009. As 
Chinese growth fell, the major commodity producers, beneficiaries of 
Chinese orders and investments, were initially hit hard. 
In the event, the slowdown in economic growth in China in particular 
was short lived. China embarked on a massive stimulus package in late 
2008, twice the size relative to GDP of the US package. By August 2010, 
industrial production was 13.9 per cent higher than a year earlier, retail 
sales had increased by 18.4 per cent, bank lending climbed 18.6 per cent 
and fixed asset investment rose by 24 per cent (Bradsher, 2010). The 
Chinese recovery helped to lift those economies that are now tied closely 
to its markets, most obviously Australia and Brazil. 
Nonetheless, there are limits to the capacity of China to replace the 
United States as a locomotive for the world economy. First and most 
obviously, the Chinese economy, given current exchange rates, which are 
the appropriate measurement when considering relative sizes of 
economies on a world scale , is still substantially smaller than the United 
States (IMF, 2011).5 Second, the Chinese economy suffers from a series 
of severe internal problems. These include a longstanding property 
bubble and an extremely lopsided economy (McNally, 2011: 7-8). 
Chinese growth is driven by very high levels of investment, rather than 
domestic consumption (the reverse of the US) (Harman, 2009: 244-45). 
Those parts of the 2009 stimulus package that did not go into property 
speculation went largely into infrastructure, especially roads, railways 
and runways, thereby building more excess capacity in the Chinese 
economy. Where the capacity is being used (as distinct from the ghost 
roads and railways that lead nowhere or the virtually uninhabited new 
cities being built in the interior), it is being used to move goods to the 
coasts for export. 
The growth of Chinese export capacity highlights the limited 
contribution that China can make to lifting the US economy out of its 
current slow growth trajectory. The US is now attempting a version of 
the strategy pursued successfully by China and Germany in the 2000s – 
                                                           
5  The IMF (2011a) estimates US GDP in 2010 at $14.66 trillion and China’s at 
$5.88 trillion. 
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to win a competitive edge by suppressing or cutting real wages and 
holding down its exchange rate. In the 12 months to the end of April 
2011, the US dollar fell by 8.6 per cent against the euro, 11.9 per cent 
against the yen, 17.8 per cent against the Swiss franc, 13.9 per cent 
against the Australian dollar, 7.0 per cent against sterling but only 4.7 per 
cent against the yuan (Index Mundi, 2011). Evidently, the US has had 
more success in devaluing its currency with respect to some countries 
than others. China, in particular, but also other Asian nations which are 
now increasingly tied to the yuan, is very reluctant to see its 
competitiveness undermined in this way. So much of the Chinese 
economy is oriented to exports that any sudden loss of competitiveness 
would have a devastating impact on the broader economy. Although 
Chinese trade surpluses shrank in the last part of 2010 and early 2011, 
there is no indication that China’s net trade balance will contribute to 
GDP expansion amongst its trading partners in any substantial way in the 
foreseeable future.  
Tension between the US and China on these grounds is the basis of the 
so-called ‘currency war’ which became the subject of intense controversy 
at successive meetings of finance ministers and heads of state at IMF and 
G20 meetings in late 2010. If globally coordinated measures to adjust 
exchange rates do not eventuate, the temptation will be for individual 
governments to proceed to tariffs and quotas to address the imbalances 
directly. In September 2010 the US government called on the WTO to 
investigate Chinese restrictions on imports of US steel exports and the 
operations of US electronic payment providers too. China in turn claims 
that US steel is subsidised and is being dumped on the Chinese market 
(Beatty, 2010). 
Conclusion 
The GFC was not caused by a lack of regulation, bankers’ greed or 
simply speculation, even if all of these played a role in its severity. The 
crisis was not restricted to the financial sphere, nor did it have its origins 
in the financial sector. Rather, crises occur organically, as part of the 
normal workings of productive capitalism; as Marx wrote in Capital 
volume III, ‘the real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself’. The 
current crisis in the US economy has its origins in the factors that 
brought an end to the long post-war boom that had never been fully 
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resolved.  Moreover, the methods that were used to promote profitability 
from the early 1980s onwards– for example, the suppression of working 
class living standards and the increasing recourse to speculation – may 
have helped to ameliorate the situation for a period but only added to the 
problems in the long run. 
Today the US is in the midst of a deep and intractable crisis. Even though 
the country may no longer be in recession, technically speaking, it can in 
no sense be said to be on a growth trajectory. Consumer spending and 
fixed investment are lacklustre. Unemployment remains high. Austerity 
budgets stretching out more than a decade into the future are likely to 
further crimp domestic demand. And the country continues to run a large 
balance of trade deficit. The crisis is by no means restricted to the US. As 
the world’s largest economy, the centre of the world financial system, the 
principal destination for world exports, and the world’s biggest foreign 
investor, America’s anaemic recovery has serious repercussions for the 
rest of the world economy. Other G7 member states are also barely 
growing and they too are now engaging in serious austerity measures. 
Although this article has not considered the Chinese economy in any 
depth, it is also difficult to see how China can maintain its current rates 
of growth indefinitely, given that so much of its growth over the past 
three decades has been focused on the US domestic market. 
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe may yet spark off a second round of 
financial collapse and, with most governments now heavily in debt, it is 
also difficult to see how they can undertake another round of bailouts and 
stimulus packages in such an event. Nonetheless, such is the size and 
interconnectedness of the banking and productive sectors today, both 
nationally and globally, that it is unlikely that governments could allow 
the kind of multiple and linked corporate bankruptcies that such a 
financial collapse would bring about if left unchecked. The problem is, 
however, that precisely such a string of bankruptcies is required to purge 
the system of unprofitable capital and prepare the way for a resolution of 
the crisis and the resumption of growth on the lines of the post-war 
boom. The processes of weakening profitability in the productive sector 
and monopolisation of capital have intertwined in such a way as to create 
an impossible dilemma for the capitalist classes and their states.  
At present, the only ‘resolution’ that the capitalist states are willing to 
prosecute is one of driving down working class living standards through 
unending austerity budgets. That this may only further drive down output 
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and income and raise unemployment in the advanced economies is 
evidently deemed to be of little importance, compared to the lift in 
profitability that cuts to corporate tax and reduced wages will create. The 
current crisis reinforces our understanding that prosperity for the 
capitalist class need have nothing to do with economic growth and well-
being for the mass of society and that any proposals to ‘fix’ the crisis by 
any means short of a frontal challenge to the priorities of capitalism are 
doomed to fail. 
 
Tom Bramble is a senior lecturer at UQ Business School, University of 
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